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The Effect of Works Councils on 
 Employment Change  
 
 
Despite recent changes in the relationship between unionism and various indicators of 
firm performance, there is one seeming constant in the Anglophone countries: unions at 
the workplace are associated with reduced employment growth of around -2.5% a year. 
Using German data, we examine the impact of the works council – that country’s form of 
workplace representation – on employment change, 1993-2001. The German institution 
appears to have much the same negative effect on employment growth. That said, 
survival bias seems to play a small role, and works councils do not seem to further slow 
the tortuous pace of employment adjustment in Germany. 
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Introduction 
In an interesting analysis of the 1984 (1980) WIRS, Blanchflower, Millward, and 
Oswald (henceforth BMO) (1991) provided estimates of the union employment 
differential of -3 (-2.5) percentage points per annum. These first published estimates for 
Britain immediately attracted controversy. In particular, Machin and Wadhwani (1991) 
countered that there was no union effect per se, arguing that the reduced employment 
growth in unionized plants was only observed in those establishments that had 
experienced organizational change. Since they equated organizational change with the 
elimination of restrictive practices, it follows that Machin and Wadhwani saw something 
rather positive (however proximate) behind the negative association between union 
presence and employment growth, where observed. Their interpretation also contrasts 
with the conventional notion that worker representation has detrimental effects on the 
number of jobs via the union wage premium.  
 However, in the years following this localized debate the negative association 
between unions and employment found by BMO (see also Blanchflower and Oswald, 
1990) has become more rather than less entrenched. First of all, a number of British 
studies have confirmed the negative association between employment change and 
unionism (e.g. Fernie and Metcalf, 1995, using the 1990 WIRS; Addison and Belfield, 
2001, using the 1998 WERS). More especially, Booth and McCulloch (1999) have 
reported that the union result is robust to the inclusion of an organizational change 
variable. Using the 1990 WIRS, these authors found that union recognition was 
associated with a 2.6 percent (5.7 percent) reduction in employment 1989-90 (1987-90). 
The constancy of the union employment effect stands out when compared with seeming 
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shifts in union impact on other firm performance outcomes over the course of the 1980s 
and 1990s (see the review in Addison and Belfield, 2004). Indeed, for the 1990 WIRS, 
Blanchflower and Burgess (1996) also find that the union ‘effect’ (of some -2.0 percent 
per annum) also survives the incorporation of a variable capturing the introduction of 
new technology as well as changes in work organization, at least in plants employing at 
least 25 manual and non-manual employees. 
Second of all, studies for other Anglophone countries have not only confirmed the 
inverse relationship between unions and employment growth but also reported similar 
point estimates. Thus, for example, in an analysis of the 1995 Australian Workplace 
Industrial Relations Survey, Wooden and Hawke (2000) reported that Australian unions 
slowed employment growth by approximately 2.5 percentage points a year. The North 
American evidence points in the same direction. Thus, in an investigation of some 1,800 
Californian manufacturing plants, 1974-1980, Leonard (1992) reports that unionization 
reduced employment growth by between 2% and 4%. Similarly, Long’s (1993) analysis 
of a sample of 510 Canadian firms indicates that union firms grew a little under 4 percent 
less than their nonunionized counterparts between 1980 and 1985.1 
In this paper, we provide estimates of the employment effects of workplace 
representation in Germany. The dual system of industrial relations in that country means 
that our principal focus will be upon the impact of the works council (or Betriebsrat).  
The works council is the vehicle of employee representation at the workplace, while the 
focus of union activity is the industry-wide or regional collective agreement. However, 
we will also examine en passant whether or not the works council effect is sensitive to 
the plant being covered by an industry-wide collective agreement. It has been suggested 
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in the German literature that other outcomes – in particular, labor productivity – are 
benefited in these circumstances. The argument is that where a works council is 
embedded in an external collective bargaining framework, the scope for the exertion of 
bargaining power at the workplace is narrowed and distributional conflict lessened,   
allowing the pro-productive aspects of works councils to come to the fore (Hübler and 
Jirjahn, 2003). While rent seeking on the part of the works council may be expected to 
limit employment growth, even in its absence delayed decision making associated with 
the information, consultation, and (above all) the codetermination rights of the works 
council in matters of labor allocation may have important negative effects on 
employment.   
 Germany is of particular interest for two main reasons. First, the Betriebsrat has 
long been looked upon with favor in European Union counsels, so that it has provided 
something of a template in the design of policies seeking to increase the involvement of 
European workers in their companies (see, for example, Official Journal, 2002). This 
policy interest is underscored by recent theoretical support for the German institution on 
collective voice/contract enforcement grounds (e.g. Freeman and Lazear, 1995). A 
second, narrower source of interest in the German situation is the availability of a unique 
data set – the Establishment Panel of the Institute of Labor Market Research of the 
Federal Labor Office (now Federal Labor Agency) – which among other things contains 
information on plant closings, allowing us to address the issue of possible selection bias 
in employment growth equations based on samples of survivors. 
The plan of the paper is as follows. We first address the issue of model 
specification. Next, background information is provided on the works council institution 
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as well as the longitudinal dataset. Results of fitting our employment change and dynamic 
labor demand equations are then presented. A brief summary concludes.  
 
Methodology 
       The standard employment growth equation. Most British employment change 
analysis has been based on two cross-sections of establishment-level data, collected in, 
say, periods t and t-j. Identification of the employment effect of worker representation 
(typically unionism, but in our case works councils) has been through an employment 
growth differential, which is the counterpart of the union wage differential in the much 
larger union wage literature. 
  Let us assume that employment level of establishment i in period t, itl , is a 
function of works council status, economic conditions, and other establishment-specific 
variables. Then, denoting worker representation by iWoco  (a dichotomous variable 
assumed fixed between t-j and t) and the other beginning-period establishment 
characteristics by jitX − , we have  
ijitijtioit eXWocoll ++++= −− βδλα  ,                                      (1) 
where λ  ( 10 << λ ) indicates the degree of employment inertia over the j-year interval. 
In this framework, the long-run works council effect will be given by )1/( λδ − , obtained 
by setting jitit ll −= . 
Empirical studies typically do not reject the null that 1=λ , which result has led 
to the employment growth equation  
                           ijitiojitit eXWocoll +++=− −− βδα .                                                  (2) 
 6
The works council employment growth differential is given by δ . Identification of δ  
does rely in this case on a number of important restrictions. In particular, we assume 
exogenous switching between works council status, or a strongly ignorable treatment 
assignment (Manski, 1995, p. 42), according to which P(Y1 | X, Woco = 1) = P(Y1 | X, 
Woco = 0) (and P(Y0 | X, Woco = 1) = P(Y0 | X, Woco = 0)), where Y1 is the outcome 
associated with works council presence and Y0 is the outcome associated with ‘no 
treatment’ (i.e. no works council). We note that this assumption, while conventional, has 
not gone uncontested in the wider performance literature; see, in particular, Zwick’s 
(2004) endogenous switching regression model of the productivity effects of 
management-led employee involvement on average productivity.     
Using logs, the dependent variable in equation (2) is a proxy for the standard 
growth rate jitjititi lllg −−−≡ /)( . Alternatively, and in order to reduce the impact of 
outliers, employment changes can be computed using the formula 
[ ]2/)(/)( itjitjititi llllG +−≡ −− . In this case, the growth rate is symmetrical about zero 
and lies between -2 (for closings) and +2 (for openings).2  
Survival bias. Implementation of model (2) is based on a sample of surviving 
establishments – in our case establishments observed in both 1993 and 2001. This raises a 
selection issue: if works councils increase the probability of workplace closure, any 
negative impact that they have on employment growth may be understated. BMO (1991, 
pp. 820-21) acknowledge that this ‘survival bias’ is a potentially serious lacuna of their 
analysis. Since we have information on closures, that is, on establishments that failed 
between t-j and t, we are in a position to evaluate the presence of any such survival bias 
in OLS estimation of model (2). Formally, this amounts to investigating whether the 
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unobserved determinants of establishment survival are correlated with the unobserved 
determinants of employment change. If the hypothesis of no correlation between the error 
terms in the two equations is rejected, then the works council effect estimated using the 
standard model will either over- or under-estimate the true effect on employment growth. 
For example, if the correlation is positive, then establishments more likely to fail will 
have lower employment growth; the marginal effect on employment growth of any 
common regressor in the two equations (the selection and outcome regressions) will then 
depend on the impact of that regressor on the probability of survival. In the case of the 
works council variable, a variable that may be presumed to explain both survival and 
employment growth, a positive correlation between error terms, combined with a 
negative impact of works council on survivability (see Addison, Bellmann, and Kölling, 
2004), will yield a smaller employment reduction in the OLS estimation. The intuition in 
this case is that works councils contribute to the failure of establishments more prone to 
reduce employment. 
More formally, and denoting the vector of all independent variables in model (2) 
by Ω , the problem can be re-formulated as 
 iii uy 1+Ω= ω ,                                                                                             (3) 
where the employment growth variable iy  is given either by ig  or iG . The outcome 
variable iy  is observed if 1=iT (i.e. where establishment i is a survivor) and is not 
observed if 0=iT (where establishment i failed). In turn, survivability is a function of 
vector W of explanatory variables as specified by the (latent) selection equation  
                 iii uWT 2
* += γ ,                                                                                            (4) 
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where 1=iT if 0* ≥iT  and 0=iT if 0* <iT . In this framework, it follows that  
),/()|()0|(
)  |(
121
*
1 Φ+Ω=−≥+Ω=≥+Ω= φρσωγωω uiiiiiiii
ii
WuuETuE
observableisyyE
   
where ρ  is the correlation between 1u and 2u , φ  is the standard normal density function, 
and Φ  is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. Clearly, rejection of no 
correlation (namely, 0=ρ ) implies that OLSω  is biased (and inconsistent). In other 
words, only by controlling for the correlation between 1u and 2u  (the ‘omitted’ variable 
in the standard OLS estimation of model (3) using survivors) can one obtain the true 
effect of works council on employment growth. Expressed another way, OLS estimation 
of model (2) will only yield unbiased results under the assumption that uncensored 
(surviving) and censored (closings) units are equally affected by the presence of works 
councils.  
Identification of the effect of works councils on employment using equations (3) 
and (4) relies on the assumption that there is an instrumental variable which explains 
selection (i.e. survivability) but not the outcome (employment growth) (see, for example, 
Manski, 1995, section 2.4). But note that in principle the selection model (3)-(4) is 
identified even if the set of variables in the selection and outcome equations are the same, 
but in this case identification is even more dependent on the specification of the model 
and its error structure being correct. 
In our dataset there is no natural candidate (or candidates) to play the role of an 
instrumental variable, since the factors that influence survival should also influence 
employment growth (see Bryson, 2004). The problem is further compounded by the fact 
that not all conditioning variables are always observed, especially in the case of plants 
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that subsequently fail. These circumstances make the selection of any instrumental 
variable more critical, resulting in an even higher risk of strong sensitivity of the findings 
to model specification than is typical in selection models.3  
One response to these problems would be simply to assume exogenous selection, 
Rather than accept that no useful inference can be drawn in the presence of censoring, 
however, we adopt two approaches. The first, and preferred route, is to examine the 
potential influence of survival bias using a “commensurate” approach in which we assign 
to closings an employment change of -100 percent, as follows directly from the formula 
jitjititi lllg −−−≡ /)( when establishment i fails.4 Second, while conscious of ad hoc 
selection problems, we also present results using an instrumental variable. We sought to 
identify a survival equation using the proportion of workers employed under fixed term 
contracts. This argument has been found to explain plant closings in the German 
literature; it is furthermore not independently correlated with employment growth. We 
prefer the former procedure because its results are not conditional on specific 
distributional assumptions placed on survival. We offer the latter procedure more by way 
of a check. 
Panel estimation. Our final approach is panel estimation that takes advantage of 
the longitudinal structure of a dataset. In this case, employment change is a one-year 
difference (the frequency of employment observation in the raw database is annual). The 
standard formulation of an employment adjustment specification in levels of the variables 
is then given by5 
ittiititit evuXLll ++++= − )('1 βλ ,                                                 (5) 
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where L is the lag operator, β is the vector of coefficients of explanatory variables X, ui 
and vt represent unobserved firm- and time-specific effects, and eit denotes the noise 
residual. The coefficient estimate of the key argument – the lagged employment term – 
captures the degree of sluggishness in labor adjustment: the bigger the coefficient, the 
lower is the speed of employment adjustment to exogenous shocks.  
OLS estimation of dynamic labor demand models (i.e. with a lagged dependent 
variable and firm-specific effects) upwardly biases the λ  parameter in model (5).6  First-
differencing the dynamic labor demand equation removes the individual effects ui, but 
not the lagged (first-difference) employment term, which has to be instrumented using 
lagged levels of the variables. (Any non-strictly exogenous right-hand-side variable must 
also be instrumented using instruments in levels, while any strictly exogenous variable 
must be instrumented using lagged differences.) First-differences of model (5) and an 
instrumental variables method are therefore required. We will use in particular the linear 
estimator GMM-SYS developed by Blundell and Bond (1998), which is supposed to 
yield more precise parameter estimates and to reduce potentially important small sample 
bias stemming from the short sample periods of the typical panel.   
To determine whether labor demand adjustment at micro level is sensitive to the 
presence of a works council we introduce the interaction term 1* −iti lWoco  into equation 
(5). Allowing works council presence to affect employment inertia, thus gives  
ittiititiitit evuXLlWocoll +++++= −− )('* 111 βλλ .                                 (5') 
Under the hypothesis Ho: 1λ =0, employment inertia is given by λ . If Ho is rejected, 
then employment inertia is equal to )( 1λλ +  if a works council is present. Clearly, works 
councils increase employment inertia if 1λ >0. We note that although an eight-year 
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difference (between 1993 and 2001) is likely sufficient to produce statistical evidence of 
the effects of this type of worker representation on employment growth, a panel of nine 
annual observations is much less likely to reveal any corresponding impact on the speed 
of adjustment over the sample period, especially in circumstances where the employment 
inertia at establishment level is presumed to be very high anyway. 
 To avoid endogeneity problems, all units which have experienced a change in 
works council status were dropped from the sample (see footnote 9 below). It follows 
then that panel estimation of model (5) in first differences eliminates any time-invariant 
regressor, and therefore the panel employment growth differential associated with works 
councils cannot be estimated (by construction, iWoco  is fixed). 
An alternative representation would be to include a time grouping dummy Td , 
with 1=Td  if t  belongs to period T, 0 otherwise. In this case we have the model 
ittiTiTititit evutdWocoXLll +++++= − **)('1 δβλ .    (6) 
Taking then first-differences will capture Tδ , the employment growth differential 
between establishments with and without works councils in period T.7   However, we do 
not have any priors as to how to form these time grouping dummies, Td . And given the 
short length of the time-series on each unit there is moreover no natural grouping. The 
only other route would be to include the interaction term tWocoi * , where t represents a 
time trend, as follows      
      ittiiititit evutWocoXLll +++++= − *)(' 11 δβλ .                                             (7) 
First-differencing would then yield 
ittiititit evWocoXLll ∆+∆++∆+∆=∆ − 11 )(' δβλ .                                              (7') 
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In the findings section below, we will also provide evidence on the employment growth 
differential 1δ using the GMM-SYS estimator.8 
 
The Institution and the Dataset 
The Works Council. The German works council is mandatory but not automatic in 
all establishments with five or more employees. That is to say, the body has first to be 
elected: if workers in an establishment do not petition for a works council election, there 
will be no council, and if they do it is a fait accompli. As a practical matter, fewer than 
one-fifth of all plants with at least five employees have a works council, even if just over 
one-half of employees are covered by works councils (Addison, Bellmann, Schnabel, and 
Wagner, 2003).   
The size of the works council is fixed by law and is a function of the 
establishment’s employment level. More particularly, the information, consultation and 
codetermination rights of the council are also formally laid down under the law. Each is 
also a stepped function of establishment size. Thus, for example, we can with some 
justification speak of the formal powers of a council as being a datum between 21 and 
100 employees. This particular size range is important in two respects. First, there is the 
general point that it makes sense to test for the impact of a works council by size 
categories within which the powers of the institution do not vary – in the absence of 
further information on works council heterogeneity. Second, and more narrowly, there is 
the point hinted at earlier that almost all large plants have a works council and small 
plants seldom do. For our sample in 2001, for example, 40 percent of establishments with 
21-100 employees had works councils. In contrast, only 4 percent (no less than 94.5 
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percent) of plants with less than 21 (more than 100) employees had work councils. 
Findings for the subsample of establishments with 21-100 employees therefore merit 
special attention. 
The Dataset. Our data are taken from the Establishment Panel of the Institute for 
Employment Research of the Federal Labor Agency. Each year since 1993 (1996), this 
panel has surveyed several thousand establishments from all sectors of the economy in 
western (eastern) Germany. It is based on a stratified random sample – strata for 16 
industries and 10 size classes – from the population of all establishments with at least one 
employee covered by social insurance. To correct for panel mortality, exits, and newly-
founded units, the data are augmented regularly, yielding an unbalanced panel. Data are 
collected in personal interviews with the owners or senior managers of the establishments 
by professional interviewers. The panel is created to serve the needs of the Federal Labor 
Agency, and so its focus is on employment-related matters. Further information on the 
panel – including information on the questionnaire(s) and how to access the data – are 
given in Kölling (2000). 
Our inquiry uses information for the years 1993 to 2001, thus excluding eastern 
Germany in the interests of a longer panel of data. Note that some of the information 
related to year t is asked for in the survey conducted in the following year. One such 
example is the value of sales in year t; as a result our demand data will be for seven rather 
than eight waves. In turn, information on works council status is available in 1993, 1996, 
1998, 1999, 2000, and 2001 which requires some manipulation. In coding this key 
variable in the missing years, we assumed that the unobserved works council status of 
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establishment i in period t was the same as that in period t-1 (or t-2) where there was no 
reported change between t-1 (or t-2) and t+1.9  
The full sample (i.e. establishments with at least 5 employees) in the beginning 
period (1993) comprises 786 continuing establishments (i.e. establishments both 
observed in 1993 and 2001). There are also 247 closures between 1993 and 2001, on 
which we have beginning-period (i.e. 1993) information on the relevant characteristics. 
(We will also have occasion to exploit information on those plants that exited the sample 
due to panel rotation. These attritions allow us to expand our sample of plants in the key 
21-100 employee grouping.) Missing data on certain key variables in surviving 
establishments resulted in a further loss of some 190 observations. This problem is 
always confronted to a greater or lesser degree in longitudinal datasets, and in this case 
there was no discernible pattern in the missing data. 
(Table 1 near here) 
As shown in Table 1, employment growth across all establishments over the 
period 1993-2001 averaged -5.5 percent. This was the result of employment contraction 
of -11.6 percent a year in the slightly more than one-half of plants with works councils 
and very modest growth in employment of 2.6 percent a year in plants without works 
councils. The corresponding values for the subsample of plants with 21-100 employees 
were -4.0, -5.2, and -2.5 percent, respectively. These figures make the prima facie case 
for the proposition that work councils retard employment growth. Also shown in the table 
is the distribution of plants closings by works council status. For the entire sample, 
roughly 55 percent of the plant closings were in establishments with works councils.   
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       In addition to collecting data on employment, we also assembled information on 
workforce characteristics (namely, the percentage of part-time and female workers), 
establishment characteristics (the level of technology and dummies for single 
establishment entity and status as a publicly listed firm), and the average wage. This 
selection of these arguments was guided by their use in the literature and some need to 
maintain sample size. Thus, establishment size was included because prior (Anglo-
Saxon) research has suggested that growth rates are lower in larger workplaces and firms 
– perhaps because the variable is an indicator of market power – even if survival 
prospects are increasing in size. Our plant technology measure is an index from 1 to 5, 
where 1 represents state-of-the-art equipment and 5 denotes out-of-date equipment. It is 
expected that older technology will be associated with lower employment growth and 
possibly higher failure rates. Our two workforce characteristics variables are expected to 
reflect lower skill composition, and workforces that are perhaps more vulnerable to job 
loss on that account. Another justification for using the percentage of part-time workers 
reflects the fact that the employment size is not expressed in terms of full-time 
equivalents, even if this may pull in an opposite direction.  (We note that the proportion 
of workers on fixed term contracts which variable is used to identify the plant survival 
equation – has a distinct rationale: such arrangements offer an indication of the scope to 
downsize as an alternative to closure. By the same token, the variable might also signal 
difficulties that lead to closure.). Workplaces belonging to larger organizations, may be 
expected to experience greater job turnover than single independent plants as the firm 
reallocates a given set of jobs between its establishments. We have no firm priors with 
respect to the other ownership argument: publicly listed firms may be positively 
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associated with employment growth by reason of greater access to capital or they may 
record lower growth through incentives to restructure. For their part, higher wages might 
be expected to lower employment growth and not just employment levels where they are 
indicative of insider behavior. The above variables are supplemented with five, highly 
aggregative industry dummies.10  
 In addition to data on employment level and the gross wage, our dynamic labor 
demand model (see equations (5') and (7)) uses information on output demand, the prices 
of intermediate inputs, and capital. The latter argument requires some comment. Unlike 
the WIRS/WERS, the IAB Establishment Panel also contains information on the volume 
of capital investments (including ‘expansion’ or net investments), even if such data are 
missing for a large number of units. Since the expansion investment variable is only 
available from 1996 onward, we proxied annual changes in the capital stock by total 
capital investments. The measure does not therefore net out annual depreciation charges. 
Both it and all nominal variables were deflated by the GDP implicit price level, using 
OECD data. 
 
Findings 
The impact of works council presence on employment is presented in Tables 2 
through 4. In each table, we consider results for the preferred subsample of 
establishments with 21-100 employees and for the full sample of all establishments with 
at least five employees.  
  Consider first implementation of the standard employment growth model, given 
by equation (2) (with iG  as the dependent variable). As discussed earlier, this exercise 
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uses two cross-sections to characterize employment growth over our eight-year period, 
1993-2001. Employment growth is measured relative to average employment. The results 
are given in Table 2 and are quite striking. From the first column of the table we see that, 
other things being equal, works council plants grow approximately 16 percent less than 
their counterparts without works councils over the eight-year sample period. The other 
statistically significant covariates for the subsample are establishment size, the share of 
female workers, and (marginally) the wage. In contrast with some earlier findings for the 
Anglophone countries, the coefficient estimate for the employment-based establishment 
size variable is positive, although the directional influence of the two other arguments is 
as expected. 
(Table 2 near here) 
The second column of the table presents results for the whole sample. The 
negative works council effect is noticeably larger in absolute magnitude, although as was 
cautioned earlier the incidence of works councils is negligible in very small 
establishments (with less than 21 employees) and dominating in larger establishments 
(with more than 100 employees), so that in principle we prefer the results for the 
subsample, where there is a balanced representation of works councils and where 
additionally works council powers are datum (thus controlling in part for the 
heterogeneity of the institution). The directional influence of the other regressors is 
mostly the same as for the subsample. The main differences are that the wage coefficient 
estimate is better determined and the technology variable (but not the labor force 
composition arguments) achieves statistical significance at the .01 level. In addition, we 
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note that publicly listed firms grow at a materially slower rate than their counterparts, 
while there was no indication of this in the subsample.   
(Table 3 near here) 
In Table 3 we add attritions associated with panel rotation to the sample. As can 
be seen, including attritions has a major effect on sample size. Two measures of 
employment growth are used. In the first and third columns of the table, employment 
change is simply that recorded over the life of the plant in the sample. The second and 
fourth columns convert the employment change into annual equivalents, now taking into 
account the number of years that the plant is in the panel. Otherwise, the measurement of 
employment change follows that of Table 2 which pertains to survivors alone. The main 
result of the increase in sample size is to increase the absolute magnitude of the works 
council effect – note that the point estimates in columns (2) and (4) may roughly be 
compared with one-eighth of the corresponding coefficients in Table 2. This increase in 
magnitude is somewhat more pronounced for the subsample. As far as the other 
arguments are concerned, the role of more advanced technology and one of the ownership 
variables in favoring employment growth is elevated in the subsample. For the full 
sample, the most notable result is the increase in precision with which the effects of the 
variables are estimated.  
With the increase in sample size we are able to examine the effect of collective 
bargaining on the employment indicator. The results are remitted to Appendix Table 1. It 
will be recalled that some observers have claimed that where a works council is 
‘anchored’ within an external collective bargaining agreement, any distributive effects of 
the institution may be secondary to its more integrative aspects. Assuming that 
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distributive effects can be equated with reduced employment growth, we see that there 
are no overt signs of any such benefit of the dual system. The own-effect of works 
councils is reduced in absolute magnitude compared with the corresponding values in 
Table 3, but rather more to the point the collective agreement variable is statistically 
insignificant throughout and when interacted with the works council indicator is ‘wrongly 
signed’ and, in the case of the full sample, marginally significant as well.  
(Table 4 near here) 
We will return to the effects of collective bargaining below, but now turn to 
examine the vexed question of survival bias; in particular, the possibility that the negative 
employment effects of works councils may be understated in circumstances where work 
councils increase the probability of plant failure.  
In Table 4 we provide the results of our two methods of correcting for potential 
survival bias. We need to preface these results by noting that our employment change 
variable differs from that used earlier. It is a now the simple percentage change in 
employment, 1993-2001, where the denominator is 1993 employment and not average 
employment as before. Our first approach for dealing with the potential problems raised 
by plant closings is to include them directly in the analysis by characterizing closures as 
representing a -100 percent change in employment. The results of this are provided in the 
second and fifth columns of the table for the subsample and full sample, respectively. 
Since we have not before presented results for the new measure of employment change, 
the relevant base equations are provided in the first and fourth columns of the table. 
Beginning with findings for our preferred subsample, it can be seen that the effect of 
including plant closings is to increase the absolute magnitude of the works council effect 
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on employment by about one third. For the full sample the two point estimates are even 
closer together. In both cases there is overlap of the confidence intervals at conventional 
levels. From this perspective, we would conclude that failing to account for plant closings 
probably does not understate the negative effects of works councils on employment 
growth. 
  A parametric test for survival bias is contained in the third and sixth columns of 
Table 4. The framework is that of models (3) and (4). We assume here that the vector W 
in the selection equation includes all observable characteristics relevant to survival, 
namely, works council status, wage level, establishment size, the shares of part-time and 
female workers, level of technology, and ownership status. All of these arguments enter 
the employment change equation. The only new and identifying variable is the share of 
fixed-term contract workers, an argument found in other (German) research to be 
positively associated with plant closings and here not (further) associated with 
employment change. 
The third and sixth columns of Table 4 provide results for the selection and 
employment growth equations. It can be seen from the selection equation that although 
the direction of the effect of works councils on survival is negative, the point estimates 
are never statistically significant. The share of fixed-term contract workers is negatively 
associated with survival, suggesting that the variable flags hard times that lead to exit.   
The selectivity-adjusted effects in the upper panel of the table fairly closely 
resemble those reported in columns (2) and (5). In particular, the works council effect is 
virtually unchanged. The more relevant comparison is, however, across columns (1) and 
(4). For neither the subsample nor the full sample does a likelihood ratio test reject the 
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null ( 0: =ρoH ) of independence of the outcome and the selection models, implying that 
there is no reason for concern in providing OLS estimation of our employment change 
model. In other words, we do not have to be perturbed by the result that the correlation 
between the error terms in the employment growth and survival equations is negative, 
which would imply that the works council effect should be less negative (given the 
negative association between the entity and survival) and also raise a problem of 
economic interpretation because of the inference that the factors favoring survival are 
also those associated with slower growth. 
As a final exercise, we reestimated the models in Table 4 with two additional 
controls: collective bargaining coverage and an interaction term between bargaining 
coverage and works council presence. The details are again consigned to an appendix. 
While there is some suggestion from Appendix Table 2 that collective bargaining 
coverage might benefit employment growth, the interaction terms are typically perverse. 
These observations pertain to the full sample. For the subsample, the inclusion of the two 
arguments leads to parameter instability without revealing anything about the impact of 
collective bargaining: both terms are statistically insignificant throughout.  
    We would tentatively conclude from both sets of evidence that the negative 
effects of work councils on employment in the standard OLS model are not upwardly 
biased.11 But that may be cold comfort as those effects are already sizeable.   
We next turn to evidence based on our longitudinal panel, this time exploiting 
annual employment differences. The caveat in all of this is that past research points to 
very sluggish employment adjustment in Germany (e.g. Abraham and Houseman, 1994; 
Burgess, Knetter, and Michelacci, 2000). In other words, we anticipate that employment 
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inertia will be high and therefore likely dominate the process of employment 
determination. Expressed in terms of models (5'), the parameter λ  should approach unity 
(and be highly statistically significant) while 1λ should be close to zero (and perhaps 
insignificant). 
(Table 5 near here) 
The results in the first column of Table 5 confirm these expectations. As can be 
seen, the coefficient estimate of the lagged dependent variable is very large and close to 
unity, while the value of 1λ  is both small and statistically insignificant. Fitting the same 
model to data for the whole sample – in the third column of the table – produces virtually 
the same results.  
The model also includes time dummies, to capture macroeconomic events specific 
to a given year, the input price of labor, the price of intermediate input, and a measure of 
the stock of capital. Firm-specific demand shocks (the shock variable) are proxied by 
(log) changes in establishment output demand. Regarding the regression diagnostic 
statistics, they nowhere point to any specification problems: the errors are, as expected, 
negatively first order serially correlated, with no evidence of second order serial 
correlation; the null of over-identifying restrictions is not rejected (the Sargan test); and 
the joint insignificance of the coefficients included in the regression is clearly rejected. 
The selfsame panel framework also allows us to evaluate the association between 
works council presence and employment growth (the parameter 1δ  in equation (7)) 
although, as we have cautioned, persistence in the employment data and our focus on 
annual changes may prove limiting in this regard. As can be seen from the second and 
fourth columns of the table, the direction of the works council effect is of the expected 
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sign but the estimate is statistically insignificant. (As before, the respective regression 
statistics are within the expected range.) Evidently, in the German case the worker 
representation growth differential is best evaluated using a wider change interval than is 
permitted by dynamic analysis.  
 
 
Conclusions 
There is a remarkable convergence in the literature as to the effects of worker 
representation on employment change. The conclusion of BMO (1991) that worker 
representation – in their case, union coverage or density – costs job growth has stood the 
test of time. It has been replicated in subsequent studies for Britain and indeed for the 
Anglophone countries, where a central estimate is slowed employment growth in the 
order of 2.5 percent a year. The present exercise shows that this result seems also to hold 
for the very different institutional arrangements of Germany. Using data from two cross 
sections, we found that works councils were associated with reductions in employment 
growth of between 2 and 3 percent a year. 
In a new departure, we also attempted to determine whether this central tendency 
was a lower bound estimate of the true effect of works councils, given some independent 
evidence that works councils are associated with higher rates of plant closure. We 
uncovered no real evidence of survival bias. This conclusion is necessarily tentative 
because of the difficulty of finding variables that are associated with employment growth 
but not plant closings, and the crudeness of the assumption that closing events and 
employment change are commensurate, respectively. In any event, the raw estimates of 
the employment reduction associated with works councils are substantial. 
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In addition to exploring likely works council effects on employment growth using 
two cross sections of data, we more fully exploited the longitudinal nature of our dataset, 
using an employment adjustment specification in levels of variables. This approach 
yielded a negative association between the works council dummy and a time trend, 
consistent with the previous evidence. However, this growth effect was not statistically 
significant, reflecting the very high degree of employment inertia in the annual 
employment series. On the other hand, there was nothing in the data to suggest that works 
councils actually added to the sluggishness of the employment adjustment process in 
Germany. 
We end on a conjecture. The negative effect of worker representation on 
employment in Germany as in other countries is consistent with classic insider behavior 
that may take companies to the brink if not lead them over the edge. Unfortunately, there 
is no suggestion that this insider behavior is attenuated by the dual system of industrial 
relations in Germany as analysts have claimed in investigating other performance 
outcomes. That is to say, the employment effects of works councils seem to be invariant 
with respect to collective bargaining regime. 
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Endnotes 
1. However, we should note that Blanchflower and Burgesss (1996) do not detect 
negative union employment growth effects using the 1990 Australian WIRS, while both 
North American studies referred to suggest that the union effect is concentrated among 
larger establishments/firms. 
 
2. Omitting subscript i, the two growth rates are monotonically related by the formula 
)2/(2 GGg −= ; see Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996, p. 26).   
 
3. Sensitivity of the results to the set of instrumental variables in selection models is 
widely documented; see, inter al., Ahn and Powell (1993), Bound, Jaeger, and Baker 
(1995), Newey, Powell, and Walker (1990), and Staiger and Stock (1997). 
 
4. We are thankful to our editor for suggesting this approach. 
 
5. Of course in this case the findings are only valid for surviving establishments. 
 
6. An empirical illustration of this result in the context of labor demand can be found in 
Arellano and Bond (1991), and a formal proof of the bias in the OLS estimator is given 
by Hsiao (2003, pp. 73-74). 
 
7. This particular approach is followed by Nickell, Wadhwani, and Wall (1992). First 
differences of model (6) would yield 
 ittTiTititit evdUXLll ∆+∆++∆+∆=∆ − *)('1 δβλ . 
 
8. Hsiao (2003, pp. 85-86) describes an instrumental variable procedure in which the 
coefficient estimate of any time-invariant regressor included in model (5) is estimated via 
OLS in a second and final step where the estimated λ  and β  are substituted into the 
initial model in levels. Since the information requirements associated with the required 
instrumental variables procedure – pertaining in particular to the number of cross-section 
units and the length of the time-series – are far from being met in our data set, we decided 
to stick with the GMM-SYS estimator, and rather provide evidence on the employment 
growth differential 1δ  within the context of model specification (7).   
 
9. Less than 2 percent of all establishments changed works council status over the eight-
year interval. Accordingly, we chose to drop them from the sample.  
 
10. Namely, manufacturing industries using mineral and other resources; manufacturing 
industries producing investment goods; manufacturing industries producing consumer 
goods plus construction; trade, transport, storage, and communications industries; and 
other services. The omitted category is the extractive industries. Agriculture, banking, 
and insurance were excluded from the sample. 
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11. But for British evidence that accounting for sample selection may increase the 
absolute magnitude of the union effect on employment growth, see Bryson’s (2004) 
analysis of the 1990-98 WIRS Panel.   
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TABLE 1 
EMPLOYMENT GROWTH RATES IN CONTINUING ESTABLISHMENTS AND PLANT CLOSINGS, 
1993-2001, BY WORKS COUNCIL STSTUS AND ESTABLISHMENT SIZE 
 
Establishment size  
21-100 employees All establishments 
 (≥5 employees) 
(a) Employment growth   
  Works council establishments  -5.2 (n = 61)  -11.6 (n =432) 
  Non-works council establishments   -2.5 (n =117)   +2.6 (n =319) 
  All establishments  -4.0 (n =185)  -5.5 (n =786) 
(b) Plant closings   
  Works council establishments 47% (n =32) 54% (n =134) 
  Non-works council establishments 53% (n =36) 45% (n =112) 
  All establishments 100% (n=68) 100% (n=247) 
Notes: The growth rate is given by the 8-year employment change jitjititi lllg −−−≡ /)(  (see text). 
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TABLE 2 
DETERMINANTS OF THE CHANGE IN EMPLOYMENT, 1993-2001 
  
Establishment size  
 
Variable 
21-100 employees All establishments 
(≥5 employees) 
Works council     -0.1581*** 
(0.0551) 
     -0.2404*** 
 (0.0550) 
Wages -0.1257* 
(0.0699) 
     -0.1445*** 
 (0.0450) 
Establishment size      0.5178*** 
(0.0374) 
       0.0921*** 
 (0.0149) 
Share of part-time employees 0.2380 
(0.1614) 
 0.1297 
 (0.1316) 
Share of female employees   -0.2773** 
(0.1259) 
                    -0.1386 
                    (0.0898) 
Index of technology                      -0.0389 
                     (0.0296) 
     -0.0944*** 
 (0.0229) 
Single establishment firm                      -0.0140 
                     (0.0564) 
0.0356 
(0.0403) 
Publicly listed firm                       0.0599 
                     (0.1535) 
    -0.1832*** 
(0.0528) 
Constant + industry dummies Yes Yes 
   
Adjusted R2 0.63 0.11 
 
F 19.20 6.83 
N (surviving establishments) 143 600 
Notes: The model specification is given by ijitioi eXWocoG +++= − βδα , where 
)2/)/(()( itjitjititi llllG +−≡ −− . itl is the employment level of establishment i in period t; jitX −  
denotes beginning-period (1993) establishment characteristics; and Woco is the works council status. The 
model is estimated by OLS. The sample was extracted from a raw sample of 771 continuing establishments 
with at least 5 employees. Standard errors are given in parenthesis; ***, **, * denote statistical significance 
at the .01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively. 
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TABLE 3 
DETERMINANTS OF THE CHANGE IN EMPLOYMENT, 1993-2001, WITH ATTRITIONS 
 
Establishment size 
21-100 employees All establishments 
(≥5 employees) 
 
 
 
Variable (1) (2) (3)  (4) 
Works council   -0.2115*** 
  (0.0522) 
      -0.0320*** 
  (0.0091) 
    -0.2551*** 
(0.0390) 
    -0.0411*** 
(0.0064) 
Wage   -0.0611 
  (0.0681) 
 -0.0026 
  (0.0119) 
    -0.1386*** 
(0.0348) 
     -0.0202 *** 
(0.0057) 
Establishment size    0.4091*** 
  (0.0384) 
       0.0498*** 
 (0.0067) 
     0.0952*** 
(0.0107) 
      0.0152*** 
(0.0017) 
Share of part-time employees    0.2385 
  (0.1491) 
 0.0210 
 (0.0261) 
      0.1686*** 
(0.0962) 
    0.0326** 
 (0.0158) 
Share of female employees   -0.1746 
  (0.1098) 
-0.0129 
 (0.0192) 
    -0.2002*** 
(0.0632) 
     -0.0315*** 
 (0.0104) 
Index of technology -0.0790*** 
 (0.0272) 
     -0.0137*** 
(0.0047) 
    -0.0908*** 
(0.0165) 
     -0.0144*** 
 (0.0027) 
Single establishment firm   0.0322 
(0.0538) 
0.0065 
(0.0094) 
0.0101 
(0.0280) 
 0.0015 
 (0.0046) 
Publicly listed firm  0.4014*** 
(0.1215) 
      0.0600*** 
(0.0213) 
    -0.1410*** 
(0.0358) 
     -0.0229*** 
 (0.0059) 
Constant + industry dummies Yes Yes  Yes 
     
Adjusted R2 0.39 0.24 0.15 0.14 
F 12.25 6.68 15.85 15.24 
N (surviving establishments, 
plus attritions) 
232 232 1106 1106 
Notes: The sample includes establishments that exited the panel due to attrition. The dependent variable in 
columns (1) and (3) is given by the j-year difference Gi (see Table 2). In columns (2) and (4), the dependent 
variable is the annualized growth rate obtained dividing Gi by j (j+1 is the number of years an 
establishment is in the panel, 81 ≤≤ j ).  
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TABLE 4 
DETERMINANTS OF THE CHANGE IN EMPLOYMENT, 1993-200, CONTROLLING FOR 
POTENTIAL SURVIVAL BIAS 
Establishment size 
21-100 employees All establishments 
(≥5 employees) 
Adjusted for selection Adjusted for selection 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Unadjusted for 
selection 
 
Closings=-
100% 
Full 
maximum-
likelihood 
Unadjusted 
for selection 
 
 
Closings=-
100% 
Full maximum-
likelihood 
Change in employment (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Works council      -0.1771*** 
(0.0533) 
-0.2385*** 
  (0.0850) 
   -0.2245***  
   (0.0572) 
-0.2571***   
  (0.0587) 
-0.2305***  
  (0.0638) 
-0.2516*** 
    (0.0608) 
Wage  -0.0751 
 (0.0677) 
  -0.0329     
  (0.1042) 
   -0.0483      
   (0.0709) 
-0.1390***   
  (0.0480) 
   0.0230***    
  (0.0508) 
-0.1826*** 
    (0.0506) 
Establishment size        0.4510*** 
 (0.0362) 
0.3635*** 
 (0.0640) 
    0.4937*** 
   (0.0399) 
  0.0837***   
  (0.0159) 
  0.1176***   
  (0.0174) 
 0.0843*** 
    (0.0170) 
Share of part-time 
employees 
      0.4461*** 
(0.1563) 
0.6893*** 
 (0.2610) 
    0.2285 
   (0.1674) 
   0.3493*   
  (0.1403) 
  0.7048***    
  (0.1472) 
0.3210** 
     (0.1501) 
Share of female 
employees 
    -0.3690*** 
(0.1219) 
-0.2675     
(0.1864) 
   -0.1386       
   (0.1066) 
-0.2608***  
  (0.0958) 
  -0.1743*     
  (0.1008) 
-0.2556*** 
    (0.0982) 
Index of technology  -0.0604** 
     (0.0286) 
-0.0538     
(0.0454) 
   -0.0444      
   (0.0301) 
-0.1074***   
  (0.0245) 
  -0.0437*     
  (0.0265) 
-0.1057*** 
    (0.0250) 
Single establishment firm      -0.0511 
     (0.0546) 
-0.0138   
(0.0912) 
   -0.1020*       
   (0.0570) 
   0.0018    
  (0.0430)  
   0.0781   
  (0.0478) 
    -0.0055 
     (0.0445) 
Publicly listed firm       0.0174 
     (0.1486) 
-0.2563   
(0.2018) 
   -0.0302     
   (0.1419) 
-0.1993***   
  (0.0563) 
  -0.1580**     
  (0.0648) 
-0.2095*** 
    (0.0571) 
Constant + industry 
dummies 
Yes  Yes No industry 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes 
Selection       
Works council      -0.1216     
   (0.2370) 
      -0.0801 
    (0.1683) 
Wage       0.1893 
   (0.2929) 
   0.4367*** 
    (0.1321) 
Establishment size      -0.1413      
   (0.1989) 
   0.1881*** 
    (0.0470) 
Share of part-time 
employees 
   2.2591**   
   (0.8939) 
       1.6039** 
    (0.4040) 
Share of female 
employees 
      0.2220 
   (0.4560) 
       0.1409 
    (0.2679) 
Index of technology      -0.1326      
   (0.1287) 
       0.0987 
    (0.0703) 
Single establishment firm       0.0620 
   (0.2557) 
   0.2878*** 
    (0.1280) 
Publicly listed firm      -0.4122      
   (0.5083) 
       0.0102 
    (0.1805) 
Share of fixed-term 
contract workers 
     -1.8851*     
   (1.0549) 
      -1.298** 
    (0.6054) 
Constant + industry 
dummies 
  No industry 
dummies 
  Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.58 0.19  0.12 0.07  
F 16.39 4.44  7.09 5.73  ρ    -0.3931     
 (0.3078) 
      -0.0889    
    (0.1734) 
LR [χ2 (1)]   0.99[0.3206]   0.20 [0.6584] 
Wald χ2   188.61   95.71 
Surviving 
Non-surviving establishments  
143 197 131 
52 
600 784 561 
174 
Notes:  See models (3) and (4) in the text. They were implemented using the growth rate formula: 
jitjititi lllg −−−≡ /)( . LR is the likelihood ratio test on the independence of the outcome and selection 
models. The selection model was implemented using STATA’s one-step maximum likelihood procedure. 
Industry dummies in column (3) were dropped to achieve a quicker convergence of the model. 
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 TABLE 5 
EMPLOYMENT DETERMINATION BASED ON A DYNAMIC LABOR DEMAND MODEL GIVING 
WORKS COUNCIL EFFECTS ON BOTH THE SPEED OF EMPLOYMENT ADJUSTMENT AND 
EMPLOYMENT GROWTH  
 
Establishment size  
 
Variable 
21-100 employees All establishments 
 (≥5 employees) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
lit-1 0.9861*** 
(0.0503) 
0.9840*** 
(0.0495) 
0.9933*** 
(0.0300) 
0.9838*** 
(0.0261) 
Wageit -0.1164** 
(0.0505) 
-0.1164** 
(0.0503) 
-0.0846 
(0.0612) 
-0.0885 
(0.0617) 
Wageit-1 0.0667 
(0.0491) 
0.0668 
(0.0494) 
0.0546 
(0.0356) 
0.0562 
(0.0351) 
Price of intermediate inputit 0.0125 
(0.0126) 
0.0122 
(0.0124) 
-0.0035 
(0.0148) 
-0.0032 
(0.0138) 
Capitalit -0.0108 
(0.0093) 
-0.0106 
(0.0092) 
0.0064 
(0.0128) 
0.0067 
(0.0125) 
Shockit 0.1188*** 
(0.0387) 
0.1186*** 
(0.0388) 
0.0780*** 
(0.0272) 
0.0778*** 
(0.0272) 
lit-1* Works councilit a  
 
-0.0064 
(0.0085) 
 
⎯ 
-0.0131 
(0.0146 
⎯ 
Works councilit* t b   ⎯ 
-0.000013 
(0.000016 
 
⎯ 
-0.000023 
(0.000036) 
Constant + time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Wald 633.3*** 638.7*** 16490*** 16180*** 
m1 -4.46*** -3.93*** -4.11*** -4.11*** 
m2 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.34 
Sargan 86.05 85.87 74.71 75.57 
Number of observations 678 678 2902 2902 
Number of establishments 134 134 542 542 
Notes: Model specifications in columns (1) and (3) are given by equation (5'), while columns (2) and (4) are 
given by equation (7), and were estimated using the GMM-SYS method (one-step) (see text.) The number 
of observations is given by ∑= i iTO , where the maximum (useable) length of the time-series is 7 years, 
1995-2001. Asymptotic standard errors robust to general cross-section and time-series heteroskedasticity 
are given in parentheses; Wald is a test of joint significance of the independent variables; m1 and m2 are 
tests for first- and second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals; and Sargan is a test of 
overidentifying restrictions. The instruments used are: 132 ,...,, iitit lll −− ; 2−itw ; 1−itp , and 1−itk  for the 
differenced equations, and 1−∆ itl , 1−∆ itw , 1−∆ itp , 1−∆ itk for the levels equations. w denotes the wage 
level, p the price of the intermediate input, and k the capital stock; the shock variable is defined as the first 
difference of (log) output demand, and p is given by intermediate input divided by total employment. In the 
estimation, we have used the DPD 1.2 software for OX, version 3.30, available at 
http://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/Users/Doornik. 
a denotes works council effect on the speed of employment adjustment.  
b denotes works council effect on employment growth. 
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APPENDIX TABLE 1  
DETERMINANTS OF THE CHANGE IN EMPLOYMENT, 1993-2001, WITH ATTRITIONS AND 
CONTROLLING FOR COLLECTIVE AGREEMENT COVERAGE 
 
Establishment size  
 
Variable 
21-100 employees All establishments 
(≥5 employees) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Works council   -0.1682* 
  (0.0916) 
    -0.0341**   
 (0.0161) 
    -0.1799*** 
(0.0564) 
  -0.0287***  
      (0.0093) 
Collective agreement    0.0459 
  (0.0589) 
 0.0035       
 (0.0103) 
0.0459 
(0.0417) 
        0.0053 
(0.0068) 
Collective agreement*works 
council 
  -0.0646 
  (0.1067) 
 0.0026      
  (0.0187) 
-0.1071* 
(0.0585) 
      -0.0172*   
      (0.0096) 
Wage   -0.0510 
  (0.0694) 
-0.0021      
 (0.0122) 
    -0.1382*** 
(0.0349) 
   -0.0202*** 
       (0.0057) 
Establishment size   0.4055*** 
  (0.0388) 
     0.0497***   
(0.0068) 
     0.0958*** 
(0.0107) 
     0.0154***   
(0.0017) 
Share of part-time employees    0.2415 
  (0.1509) 
0.0195   
(0.0265) 
 0.1775* 
(0.0963) 
   0.0341**   
(0.0158) 
Share of female employees   -0.1643 
  (0.1119) 
     -0.0112        
     (0.0196) 
    -0.2011*** 
(0.0633) 
    -0.0319***   
(0.0104) 
Index of technology  -0.0779*** 
  (0.0273) 
    -0.0136***   
(0.0048) 
    -0.0896*** 
(0.0165) 
    -0.0142***   
(0.0027) 
Single establishment firm    0.0360 
  (0.0542) 
0.0068   
(0.0095) 
0.0077 
(0.0280) 
0.0011 
(0.0046) 
Publicly listed firm    0.4086*** 
  (0.1231) 
     0.0591***   
(0.0216) 
    -0.1380*** 
(0.0359) 
    -0.0224***   
(0.0059) 
Constant + industry dummies Yes  Yes  
     
Adjusted R2 0.38 0.24 0.15 0.15 
F 10.59 5.76 13.96 13.44 
N (surviving establishments, 
plus attritions) 
232 232 1105 1105 
Notes: See Table 3.  
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APPENDIX TABLE 2 
DETERMINANTS OF THE CHANGE IN EMPLOYMENT, 1993-2001, CONTROLLING FOR 
POTENTIAL SURVIVAL BIAS AND COLLECTIVE AGREEMENT COVERAGE 
Establishment size 
21-100 Employees All Establishments (≥5 employees) 
Adjusted for selection Adjusted for selection 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Unadjusted 
for selection Closings=
-100% 
Full maximum-
likelihood 
Unadjusted 
for selection Closings=-
100% 
Full maximum-
likelihood 
Change in employment (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Works council    -0.0953    
   (0.0956) 
-0.1459     
(0.1482) 
-0.1973* 
(0.1018) 
   -0.1446*      
   (0.0864) 
 -0.2274**  
 (0.0946) 
-0.1533* 
(0.0893) 
Collective agreement     0.0611    
   (0.0599) 
 0.0966   
(0.1013) 
0.0589 
(0.0617) 
  0.1264**    
   (0.0598) 
  0.1085*   
 (0.0660) 
  0.1163* 
(0.0618) 
Collective agreement*works 
council 
   -0.1216        
   (0.1110) 
-0.1682   
(0.1701) 
      -0.0445 
(0.1138) 
   -0.1671* 
   (0.0885) 
 -0.0351     
 (0.0973) 
-0.1501* 
(0.0917) 
Wage    -0.0589      
   (0.0692) 
-0.0390  
(0.1088) 
      -0.0332 
(0.0721) 
   -0.1325*** 
   (0.0480) 
  0.0176      
 (0.0512) 
    -0.1757*** 
(0.0505) 
Establishment size     0.4451***   
   (0.0366) 
0.3394***  
(0.0629) 
      0.4933*** 
(0.0408) 
   0.0832***   
   (0.0159) 
  0.1098***    
 (0.0178) 
      0.0849*** 
(0.0166) 
Share of part-time 
employees 
    0.4542*** 
   (0.1576) 
0.6098** 
(0.2623) 
0.2519 
(0.1612) 
   0.3724***   
   (0.1404) 
0.6633***  
 (0.1507) 
    0.3550** 
(0.1482) 
Share of female employees   -0.3573***    
   (0.1237) 
-0.3966**   
(0.1967) 
      -0.1197 
(0.1079) 
   -0.2469*       
   (0.0958) 
 -0.1843*     
 (0.1031) 
  -0.2468** 
(0.0979) 
Index of technology    -0.0608**     
   (0.0288) 
-0.0837*   
(0.0455) 
      -0.0441 
(0.0305) 
  -0.1083*** 
   (0.0245) 
 -0.0689**  
 (0.0269) 
    -0.1058*** 
(0.0249) 
Single establishment firm    -0.0398      
   (0.0560) 
 0.0159   
(0.0907) 
-0.0938* 
(0.0578) 
    0.0049       
   (0.0432) 
  0.0665   
 (0.0480) 
      -0.0015 
(0.0443) 
Publicly listed firm     0.0381    
   (0.1503) 
-0.1650   
(0.2069) 
      -0.0381     
      (0.1423) 
   -0.1943*** 
   (0.0562) 
 -0.1695***     
 (0.0648) 
     -0.2056*** 
(0.0569) 
Constant + industry 
dummies 
Yes Yes No industry 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes 
Selection       
Works council         -0.3343 
(0.4216) 
        -0.3252 
(0.2581) 
Collective agreement   0.1972 
(0.3239) 
  0.2386 
(0.1850) 
Collective agreement*works 
council 
  0.0689 
(0.4862) 
  0.3394 
(0.2664) 
Wage    0.1950 
(0.3346) 
        0.4936*** 
(0.1441) 
Establishment size         -0.2320 
(0.2137) 
        0.1623*** 
(0.0528) 
Share of part-time 
employees 
         1.3744 
      (0.8897) 
      1.555*** 
(0.4490) 
Share of female employees          0.4170 
(0.5225) 
  0.1682 
(0.2952) 
Index of technology         -0.2115 
(0.1410) 
  0.0276 
(0.0775) 
Single establishment firm          0.1556 
(0.2738) 
    0.2669* 
(0.1405) 
Publicly listed firm         -0.2975 
(0.5557) 
        -0.0396 
(0.1985) 
Share of fixed-term contract 
workers 
  -2.1079*   
(1.0850) 
     -1.5202** 
(0.6532) 
Constant and industry 
dummies  
  No industry 
dummies 
  Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.58 0.20  0.12 0.07  
F 14.24 4.09  6.51 4.92  
ρ   -0.3957 (0.327)   -0.0936 (0.166) 
LR [χ2 (1)]   0.95 [0.3304]   0.23 [0.6287] 
Wald χ2   189.54   100.27 
Surviving 
Non-surviving establishments 
143 185 131 
40 
600 738 561 
129 
Notes: See Table 4. 
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